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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
PACIFIC METALS COMPANY, DIVISION 
OF A.M. CASTLE & COMPANY, a cor-
poration, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff, and Appellant, 
and 
BANK OF SALT LAKE, 
Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
vs. 
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Third-Party 
Plaintiff, and Appellant, 
vs. 
OLYMPUS HEATING AND AIR CONDI-




Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff, Pacific Metals 
Company, Division of A. M. Castle and Company, 
against defendants Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust 
2 
Company and Bank of Salt Lake to recover the prir1• 
cipal amount of $5.321.70, plus interest and costs 011 
a joint payee check deposited by Olympus Hea.tinCJ 
and Air Conditioning, a third-party defendant, with-
out the endorsement of the plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of ths 
District Court of Salt Lake County, granted a Sum-
mary Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant Tracy-Collins for a conversion of the 
check in the sum of $.S,978.41 interest and costs, de 
nied the defendant Tra_cy-Collins' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment against the plaintiff, denied the 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment again:.;! 
the defendant Bank of Salt Lake and granted the 
Bank of Salt Lake's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Tracy-Collins and the plaintiff no cause of 
action. (R. l l 3-114, 143-144) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks an affirmation of its Sum-
mary Judgment against Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust 
Company and a reversal of the Judgment denyinq 
the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against 
the Bank of Salt Lake and a reversal of the J udgrnent 
granting Bank of Sult Lake's Motion for Summar\' 
Judgment against the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As stated, the Appellant's "Statement of Facts' 
is deficient and misleading in that it omits certain 
3 
necessary and important facts, misstates other facts 
and assumes as facts matters not supported by the 
record, giving its "Statement of Facts" the effect oi 
un argument. 
Except, however, as supplemented and cor-
rected below. the respondent agrees with the State-
ment of Facts set forth by the appellant. 
The respondent asserts that the following lan-
guage in the first unnumbered paragraph on page 
6 of the Appellant's Brief, ", ... Olympus as its own-
er and the owner of the funds represented by it, 
... ", is a conclusion unsupported by reference to 
the record and in fact unsupported by the record. 
The respondent asserts that the second un-
numbered paragraph on page 6 of the Appellant's 
Brief misstates the facts and that the additional facts 
set forth below fairly state the facts on record and 
a.re not inconsistent with the portions of the record 
referenced by appellant in support of that para-
graph. 
The following facts sho1Jld be added to the 
Statement: 
The facts set forth in appellant's "Statement of 
Nature of the Case" are adopted as a part of the 
Statement of Facts in the case. 
The question of payroll and overhead was not 
discussed by Olympus and Pacific Metals when they 
entered into their agreement for joint payee checks 
from Mayne. (Stott depo. p. 41, Williams depo. pp. 7, 
29 & 30) 
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It was the intent of Olympus and Pacific Metals 
through thls joint payee agreement to pay for pur-
chases made for the East High School job and to 
clear the past due indebtedness owing by Olympus 
to Pacific Metals existing at the commencement of 
the East High School job. (\!Villiams depo. pp. 7, 1\ 
& 16; Stott depo. pp. 4, 6-10 & 34) 
At the time the check ]n question was issued 
Pacific Metals and Olympus knew the job was about 
completed. (Stott depo. p. 14; Wllliams depo. p. 24) 
Olympus still owed Pacific Metals more than the 
amount of the check in question, (R 48, 107; Stott 
depo. pp. 47 & 48) and one hundred percent of all 
amounts still remaining unpaid to Olympus on the 
East High School job would be required to pay off 
the indebtedness to Pacific Metals. (Stott depo. pp. 
12, 13 & 14, R 107) 
In addition, it was the agreement of Olympus 
and Pacific Metals that the negotiation on each 
check was to determine how much, if any, Olym-
pus would be entitled to receive back from Pacific 
Metals (Stott depo. pp. 11, 12, 16, 17, 24, 50, & 51; 
Williams depo. pp. 5, 22, 24) and would be based on 
the balance of the account with Pacific Metals. (Stott 
depo p. 6) Further there was no specific agreement 
to negotiate the check in question (Stott depo. pp. 11, 
17; Williams depo. p. 24; R 48) and both Pacific 
Metals and Olympus understood Pacific Metals was 
entitled to the full amount of the check in question. 
(Stott depo. p. 52; Williams depo. pp. 22 & 24, R 45 
and 55) Finally, Olympus claims no interest in the 
5 
check and acknowledges Pacific Metals right there-
to. (Stott depo. pp. 24 & 52; R. 45) A subsequent check 
for $3,071.70 was in fact endorsed by Olympus and 
retained in full by the plaintiff. (R. 107) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF A MATE-
RIAL FACT ON WHICH TRIAL IS REQUIRED. 
There is not one statement in the record to the 
effect that Olympus was the owner of the check in 
question and solely entitled to the entire proceeds 
therefrom. This is a "fact" implied into the case by 
Appellant in the face of direct statements to the con-
trary and an obvious agreement to the contrary as 
evidenced by the Statement of Facts as supple-
mented by R.espondent and Cross-Appellant. The 
Appellant was forced to abbreviate greatly its State-
ment of Facts in order to throw a ray of credibility 
on its implication. 
This transaction involved a contract between 
Mayne, Olympus and Pacific Metals, each receiv-
ing consideration and each agreeing to the arrange-
ment. Mayne was to receive performance by Olym-
pus on its contract. Olympus was to receive from 
Pacific Metals the necessary materials to perform 
its contract and Pacific Metals was to receive pay-
ment for a past indebtedness, as well as payment 
for materials to be delivered on the job in question. 
The parties involved in the contract do not disagree, 
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but Appellant having erred in its handling of th: 
check in question and having improperly payeJ 
and processed the same, now attempts to save it::: 
"chestnuts" by stirring up a fire of litigation be-
tween the parties to the contract who are in agree-
ment. The law certa_inly should not look favorably 
upon such third-party irn=;pired litigation. 
Olympus and Pacific Metals requested Mayne 
put both their names on the checks and thereafter 
Olympus, on each occasion, with the exception ol 
the check in question, attempted to obtain back 
from Pacific Metals as much of the check as possible 
to meet its current obligations. Both admit their in 
tention to clear the indebtedness of Olympus to 
Pacific Metals. Both admit the necessity of applying 
all of the check in question, plus all future checks, 
in order to accomplish that purpose and both admit 
the entitlement of Pacific Metals to all of, the pro-
ceeds of the check in question. 
The stated intentions and understandings of the 
parties are of utmost importance in determining the 
terms of an oral contract and thus, whether or not 
there is a conflict in the facts. In Wiliston on Con· 
tracts, third edition by Walter H. E. Jaeger, Baker 
Voorhis and Company, Inc., 196 l, Vol. 4, Interpreta-
tion and Construction of Contracts, Section 605, at 
pp. 789 and 790, it is stated: 
"An important aid in the interpretation of contracts 
is the practical construction placed on the agreement 
by the parties themselves. The process of practi_cal 
interpretation and application is a further indicat10n 
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by the parties of the meaning which they have placed 
upon the terms of the contract they have made. 
Courts give great weight to these expressions, be 
they acts or declarations." 
The above quote cites as one of its authorities 
the case of Scotch Mfg. Co. v. Carr, 53 Fla. 480, 43 
S. 427, where it is stated: 
"If it be true, even in the case of a written contract, 
the terms of which are doubtful or ambiguous, that 
the construction placed thereon by the parties them-
selves may be shown and shall govern, as the cited 
cases hold, with how much more force does this prin-
ciple apply to oral contracts? The principles of 
technical nicety cannot be strictly applied in the 
construction of these everyday oral contracts made 
by plain businessmen in their course of trade and 
traffic. To do so would frequently result in over-
throwing the meaning and understanding of the 
parties." 
Thus, when Olympus admits Pacific Metals was 
entitled to the full amount, Pacific Metals claims it 
was entitled to the full amount, and subsequent to 
the check in the question, an additional check is-
sued by Mayne to Olympus is handled in precisely 
the manner each asserts it should have been, the 
agreement is clear a.nd the Appellant should not be 
Permitted to attempt to save its own funds, placed 
in jeopardy by its lack of -:ittention to its duties. 
To embrace the construction which Appellant 
attempts to set before this Court and which it at-
tempts to support by is abbreviated Statement of 
f ctcts, would leave without effect a practice common 
in the construction industry, that of securing debts 
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by joint payee checks. This practice has proved 
most advantageous to our community and should be 1 
stimulated rather than stifled. Such arrangements 
should be given the effect intended by those who 
enter into them, that of securing payment for the • 
purchase of materials required for performance o! 
the less powerful contractors. Such was certainly 
the intent in this case. Both parties acknowledged 
that intent. Both parties recognized the necessity o! 
Pacific Metals retaining all of the proceeds of the 
check in question in order to give effect to that in-
tent. 
The fact that Pacific Metals used discretion in 
exercising its rights on previous checks, cannot in 
retrospect be cast back as a stone by Tracy-Collins, 
the originator of the present problem and the self-
asserted discoverer of a dispute where none existed. 
At the time this check was issued the job was 
soon to be completed. More of Olympus' debt to 
Pacific Metals remained unpaid than could be cov-
ered by all amounts still to be paid by Mayne to 
Olympus on completion of the work. Pacific Metals 
could no longer afford to be generous and the fact 
that it had been in the past or that it might still have ' 
been, had Tracy-Collins not deprived it of its funds, 
cannot in speculation be used by Tracy-Collins as 
a glove to hide the stains on its own hands. 
As pointed out in Young v. Felomia, 121 Utah 
646, 244 P. 2d 862, cited by appellant on page 19 
of its Brief. A Motion for Summary Judgment should 
be denied "if there is any genuine issue as to any 
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material fact, ... " This does not apply to manufac-
tured issues or issues which may exist, but which 
are immaterial to the decision. Even if, as Appel-
lant attempts to persuade this Court, certain issues 
are somewhat less than crystal, what happened in 
the past as to previous checks would not be de-
terminative as to what was to happen on the check 
in question where the agreement is obviously to the 
contrary. 
Thus, it is the position of the Respondent that 
if any issues do remain which would require a jury 
of reasonable men to resolve, those issues are not 
ma_terial to a decision in this case, and so would not 
require an overtllrning of the Court's decision be-
low. Abdulkadir v. Westem Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, 7 U. 2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957). 
POINT II 
THE ARGUMENTS EXPOUNDED BY APPEL-
LANT AS TO ASSIGNMENT OF FUNDS BY A 
CHECK HAVE NO APPLICATION TO THE 
CASE NOW BEFORE THIS COURT. 
The Appellant's argument relating to the ques-
tion of assignment and the cases cited in support 
of that argument are not in point and do not apply 
in any way to the facts of this case. The argument 
and the cases cited relate to the premise that c 
check does not serve as an assignment by the 
maker to the payee of his funds in the drawee bank. 
There is no such question before the Court. Here 
we are concerned with an oral agreement, wherein 
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the maker agreed to put both Olympus' and Pacific 
Metals' names on the check (which it did witho;Jf 
default) and wherein Olympus and Pacific Metals 
agreed the present purchases would be secured 
and the past debt paid off in return for Pacific: 
Metals providing materials required. The materials 
were provided, but the debts were not paid off as 
agreed because of Appellant's improper processing 
of the check in question. 
The further statement by Appellant that there 
was no wr ltten assignment by Olympus to Pacific 
Metals does not neqate the actual agreement testi-
fied to by the parties and their instruction to Mayne 
to make the checks payable jointly, which had the 
effect of an assignment and which created obliga-
tions in Mayne Plumbing which Pacific Metals had 
the right to enforce if Mayne, after accepting and 
agreeing to the arrangement, failed to perform 
under it. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
FROM TRACY-COLLINS THE FULL AMOUNT 
OF THE PROCEEDS FROM THE CHECK IN 
QUESTION. 
Respondent has been unable to locate through 
extensive research any Utah cases which deal with 
the exact question of liability of a cashing and pay-
ing bank to a joint payee of a check cashed without 
the endorsement of one of the payees. There is, 
however. certain statutory and other authority in 
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the State of Utah which would compel the conciu-
sion that such banks are so liable and there are 
ample annotations and cases from other jurisdic-
tions to support that conclusion. 
Section 44-1-42, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
c m0nded in effect at the time of this transaction, 
stiltes: 
"Where an instrument is payable to the order of two 
or more payees or endorsees who are not partners, 
all must endorse unless the one endorsing has author-
ity to endorse for the other." 
Also, Section 44-1-24, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, likewise in effect at the time of this 
transaction, reads as follows: 
"Where a signature is forged, or made without 
authority of the person whose signature it purports 
to be, it is wholely inoperative, and no right to retain 
the instrument, or to give a discharge thereof or to 
enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, 
can be acquired through or under said signature, 
unless the party against whom it is sought to en-
force such right is precluded from setting up the 
forri;ery or want of authority." 
This Court in the case of Simpson vs Denver 
R.G.R. Co., 43 Utah 105, 110, 134 Pac. 883, has indi-
c:ated even in absence of the aforequoted section 
that a forged endorsement does not pass title to 
commercial paper negotiable only by endorsement. 
The Simpson Case and the above quoted statutes 
are compelling authority in the case presently be-
fore the court. 
12 
I 
These Utah authorities are even more corn- 1 
pelling in view of statements from other jurisdic- \ 
tions to the effect that: 
"We regard the absence of an endorsement by the 
holder as serious if not more so as a forged endorse-
ment. One is easily discernable; the other is the re-
sult of an error in the identification of the payee. 
If, as has been said, it is the duty of the bank cash-
ing the check to know to a positive certainty the 
identity of the payee named therein, and its failure 
so to do imposes a duty of reimbursing the drawee, , 
it seems clear to us that failure to secure the en-
dorsement of all of the payees imposes an even 
greater duty on the holder." 
American National Bank of Denver v. First National 
Bank of Denver, 277 P. 2d 951, 130 Colo. 557 (!954), , 
and again in almost identical language it is stated 
in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. 
People's National Bank. 24 Ill. App. 2d 275, 164 N.E. 
2d 497 (1960): 
"The absence of an endorsement by the holder is, i 
in our view, more serious than a forged endorsement ~ 
for the reason that the former is easily discemable 
while the latter is the result of an error in the 
identification of the payee. If, as it has been said, 
it is the duty of the cashing bank to know to a 
positive certainty the identification of the payee or 
the payees named therein and its failure so to do 
imposes a duty of reimbursing the drawee, it seems 
abundantly clear that the failure to secure the en-
dorsement of all the payees imposes an even greater 
duty on the cashing bank." 
Section 44-1-42 above quoted is identical to Sec-
tion 41 of the N.I.L. which is annotated in 5, Uniform 
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Laws Annotated, Section 41. It is there stated: 
"The endorsement of all payees is necessary to give 
good title to a transferee. (Citation omitted) This 
makes any transferee, especially including the cash-
ing bank, who takes without a valid endorsement of 
all payees, a converter of the instrument because he 
receives no title thereto. ( e.a.) 
In 38 A.LR., 799, discussing liability on joint 
payee paper without the endorsement of other 
payees thereon, it is stated: 
"A bank which has cashed a check payable to two 
persons, upon the unauthorized endorsement of one 
of them of the whole instrument, is liable to the 
other payee in the absence of ratification by him of 
the act of his co-payee." 
The annotation cites as authority the case of 
Allan v. Com Exchange Bank, 87 App. Div. 335, 84 
N.Y. S. 1001, (1903), which is a missing endorsement 
case. That case held that the endorsement of one of 
two joint payees was insufficient to pass to the Corn 
Exchange Bank the interest of the plaintiff in the 
money represented by the check. 
In the Colorado case of American National Bank 
of Denver vs First National Bank of Denver, supra at 
page 12, which interpreted a statute similar to our 
own, the court stated: 
"Under the common law as well as by our 'Negotiable 
Instruments Law', where one of the payees fails to 
endorse, the negotiability of the check is completely 
destroyed, (Citation omitted)." 
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And at p. 956 it states: 
"At best, Herford [the cashing bank], was entitled 
to retain only the financial interest that Frontier 
Motor Co. had in the check in question." 
Frontier was the payee who actually deposited the 
check without the endorsement of the joint payee. 
The Court further states: 
"It ... is a recognized rule of law that any bank or ' 
person cashing a drawer's check does so at its or his 
peril, being obligated to pay the same only upon 
the genuine endorsement of the payees named there-
in." 
In the case of Dawson & White vs National Bank 
of Greenville, 197, N.C. 499, 150 S.E. 38 (1929), the 
court stated: 
"Where a check is payable to two or more persons 
as payees or to their order, the amount of the check 
must be paid to both payees or upon the order of 
both. Payment to one of the payees or to the order 
of one of the payees without the authority of the 
other payee does not discharge the drawee bank of 
its liability for the amount of the check, unless the 
payees are partners. 
In the case here before the court, there is, of course, ! 
no question as to partnership-there was none. 
A most compelling authority in support of the 
plaintiff's right to recover herein is the case ol 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company vs 
People's National Bank, supra at page 12. In that 
case the court was interpreting a statute identical 
15 
to our own in a situation where an insurance com-
pany made a check payable jointly to the insured 
"J.nd to the party who repaired the insured' s dam-
0ged machinery. The insured cashed the check 
with only his endorsement and spent his money. 
The insurance company was both the drawer and 
the drawee. The insurance company, asknowledg-
mg its liability to the damaged payee, paid the 
damaged payee the amount of the check and then 
sued the bank which cashed the check without the 
endorsement of the damaged payee to recover back 
its losses. The court holding in favor of the insur-
ance company against the cashing bank states: 
"Al though decisions involving so called 'missing en-
dorsements' are few and although no reviewing court 
in Illinois has considered such a case, the Illinois 
decisions involving forged endorsements and other 
irregular endorsements provide settled authority to 
rule that one called upon to act upon the faith of a 
written instrument, including an endorsement of 
commercial paper, must ascertain its genuineness at 
its peril. The principle rests in public policy and has 
been universally considered necessary for the secur-
ity of commercial transactions." 
The Court then goes on to express its position 
quoted at page 12 above, that the cashing of a check 
with a missing endorsement is a more serious error 
on the part of the cashing bank than the cashing of 
a check with a forged endorsement. The court con-
cluded: 
"Finally, it is our conclusion that the rule is that 
a drawer-drawee and a damaged payee each has a 
cause of action against a cashing bank for damages 
16 
sustained where the cashing bank failed to obtain 
the endorsement of all co-payees on a check or draft. 
Gustin-Bacon Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank, 306 
1 
Ill., 179, 137 N.E., 793; Independent Oil Men's Ali· 
sociation v. Fort Dearborn National Bank, 311, Ill. 
278, 142 N.E. 458 ... " (e.a.) 
The position of the authorities, heretofore cited, 
to the effect that the cashing of a check with a miss· i 
ing endorsement is a more serious violation of the 
duty of a cashing bank than the cashing of a check 
with a forged endorsement, justifies a brief refer-
ence to the almost universally established rules in 
relation to forged endorsements. 
In 9 C.J.S. Banks & Banking, Section 357 at p. 
763 it is stated: 
"Where a collecting bank cashes a check on a forged 
endorsement, . . . the bank in collecting the check 
holds the proceeds for the payee, ... permitting the 
payee to maintain an action against such bank for 
the amount of the check ...• " ( e.a.) 
Also in 10 Am. Jur, 2nd, Banks, Section 632, pages 
599-600, it is stated: 
"Although there are a few scattered cases to the 
contrary, the general rule established by nearly all 
courts is that a bank or other corporation which, 
or an individual who, has obtained possession of a 
check upon an unauthorized or forged endorsement 
of the payee's signature, and has collected the amount 
of the check from the drawee, is liable for the pro· 
ceeds thereof to the payee or other owner, notwith· 
standing they have been paid to the person from ; 
whom the check was obtained, and notwithstanding 
that the payee's signature was forged by his em· 
ployee or agent." 
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In line with the above the following cases in-
terpreting statutes identical to the Utah statutes 
above quoted have held the cashing banks liable 
to joint payees where their endorsement was forged. 
Federal Insurance Company vs Toiyabe Supply 
Company, 409 P2d, 623 (Nev. 1966); Elwert vs Pacific 
First Federal Savings and Lo·an Association. 138 Fed. 
Supp. 395 ( 1956). The latter case was a circumstance 
where the husband forged his wife's signature on 
a check payable jointly to husband and wife. For 
other cases reaching the same result see: Wagner 
Trading Co. vs Battery Park National Bank. 228 N.Y. 
37, 126 N.E. 347. 9 A.LR. 340 (1920); Greshams State 
Bank vs Owen K. Construction Company. 370 P. 2d 
726, 231 Ore. 106, (1962); House-Evans Company vs 
Matoon Transfer and Storage Company, 275 P. 2d 
268, Okla. (1954); Trails Moto.rs. Inc. vs First National 
Bank of Laramie. 301 P. 2nd 775, 76 Wyo. 152 (1956); 
Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank vs First & 
Citizens National Bank. 150 S.E. 34, 197 N.C. 526 
0929): Hillsley vs State Bank of Albany. 263 N.Y.S. 
2nd 578, 24 App. Div. 2nd 28, (1965); Kaufman vs 
State Savings Bank. 114, N.W. 863 (Mich. 1908); 
Crane vs Mercantile Trust and Savings Bank. 295 
Ill., 375, 129 N.E. 120, 12 A.L.R 92. 
In view of the above authorities there can be 
little doubt but that the defendant, Tracy-Collins 
Bank and Trust Company is liable to the plainitff 
for its losses resulting from the wrongful cashing 
and processing of the check drawn by Mayne 
Plumbing and Heating and payable to Olympus 
18 
Heating and Air Conditioning and Pacific Meta'.s 
Company, jointly. 
The Utah case of Mullner vs McCormic and Co., 
Bankers 69 Utah 557, 257 Pac. 658 (1927), states: 
"The law is settled that-'the measure of damagPs 
for the conversion promissory notes, bonds and 
other evidence of indebtedness is their actual 
value not their face value. But in the absence of 
proof of the actual value, they will be deemed to be 
worth their face value, or such sums as plaintiff 
might have recovered on them'." 
See also, Hillsley vs State Bank of Albany, supra at 
page 17; Elwert vs First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association of Tacoma, Washington, supra at page 
17; and Acme Paper Company vs Goffstein, 270 
P.2d 505; 125 Cal. App. 2d 175. In the case now be-
fore the court Pacific Metals was entitled to the full 
face amount of the check as between Pacific Metals 
and Olympus, consequently, Pacific Metals would 
be entitled to recover that amount. 
POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
FROM BANK OF SALT LAKE THE FULL 
AMOUNT OF THE PROCEEDS FROM THE 
CHECK IN QUESTION. 
The arguments heretofore made relating to li-
ability of Tracy-Collins have equal application as 
against the Bank of Salt Lake. There is, however, ' 
an additional ground on which Bank of Salt Lake is 
liable to Pacific Metals. Mavne had on deposit with 
Bank of Salt Lake sufficient -monies to pay the check 
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in question. It issued a check which was in form, 
an instruction to the Bank of Salt Lake to pay to 
Olympus and Pacific Metals the face amount of the 
check. The "Prior Endorsement Guaranteed" stamp 
of Tracy-Collins did not relieve the Bank of Salt 
Lake of its duty to pay only in compliance with that 
order. When the Bank of Salt Lake actually paid the 
check in violation of tha.t Order they did so in viola.-
lion of their contractual relationship with Mayne, 
their depositor and to the damage of the third-party 
beneficiary of that contract, Pacific Metals. 
Since the Bank of Salt Lake was serving as 
Mayne's agent in the transaction and did not corr.-
ply with its duty to make payment only on proper 
endorsement, Mayne in fact has not met its obliga-
tion on the agreement with Pacific Metals and 
would be liable to them. It is not necessary, how-
ever, for Pacific Metals to sue Mayne and for Mayne 
to sue the Bank of Salt Lake. This can be done in 
one simplified action under the theory of a third-
party beneficiary contract. 
In the early case of Utah National Bank of Salt 
Lake City v. Nelson, 38 Utah 169, 111 Pac. 907 (1910), 
this court applied the third-party beneficiary theory 
to a promissory note. The court stated at page 913: 
"A consideration to a third-party may be an induce-
ment to a person to give his note, and in such case 
the promise is just as binding as though the promis-
sor had received the benefit." 
20 
The court stated further at page 914: 
"Where a promise or contract has been made be-
tween two parties for the benefit of a third, an action 
will lie thereon at the instance and in the name oi 
the party to be benefited, although the promise or 
contract was made without his knowledge and with-
out any consideration moving from him." 
In a more recent case this Court applied the 
third-party beneficiary theory to the relationship 
between a depositor and drawee bank and the 
liability thereby incurred to the beneficiary of their 
agreement. In Walker Bank and Trust Company v 
First Security Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 215, 341 P.2d 
944 (1959), the defendant, drawee bank, argued 
there was no privity of contract between itself and 
plaintiff, because plaintiff was not a party to the 
contract and only indirectly a beneficiary thereo!. 
The case involved a sight draft authorization re· 
questing and authorizing the bank to charge to the 
depositor's account sight drafts to be drawn by the 
insurance company for monthly premiums on an 
insurance policy. This court held the bank liable 
to the Beneficiary under the insurance policy for the 
full face value of the policy stating at page 945: 
"It is often stated that privity of contract is a pre-
requisite to holding one liable for breach of duty 
thereunder. But it is also recognized that there are 
duties to others than the immediate parties, where 
from the nature of the contract, it is plainly evident 
to the promissor that the contract is for the benefit 
of third persons and that a failure to discharge his 
duty would adversly affect them." 
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"In considering the Bank's duties to the beneficiaries 
it is appropriate to look to the foundations of that 
relationship. Between the bank and depositor it is 
that of debtor-creditor to the extent of the custo-
mer's balance and it is the bank's duty to pay up to 
that amount to anyone on the depositor's order and 
in conformity with his direction, and this is also 
usually true even where the depositor authorizes 
another to draw on his account. ... " (e.a.) 
The court stated further at page 946: 
"Having accepted the responsibility, the duty to 
fulfill it ran both to the depositor and to her bene-
ficiaries for whom she maintained the policy and the 
bank was obliged to evercise due care in performing 
that duty at least until it notified the insured to the 
contrary. Its failure to do so renders it liable to the 
beneficiaries who are harmed thereby despite lack 
of privity between them." (e.a.) 
In footnote 3 of the Walker Bank case just re-
ferred to this Court summarized the authorities 
which discuss the payee's duty to pay in conformity 
to the depositor's direction and cited with approval 
the case of American National Bank of Denver vs 
First National Bank of Denver. Supra at page 12. 
That case is very much in point and should be con-
trolling on the issue of Bank of Salt Lake's liability. 
In that case the Colorado Supreme Court stated 
at page 954: 
"The drawee bank is authorized to pay out funds be-
longing to its depositor when. and only when, the 
check is endorsed by the payees therein, or by per-
sons who have satisfied it or the bank to which the 
check is presented for payment of their right to the 
22 
proceeds. We believe it to be the duty of the ban!: 
upon which a check is drmvn to satisfy itself that it 
is correctly endorsed; ... " 
The drawee bank has a "duty to the drawer to in-
vestigate the endorsement on the check in order 
that it may determine whether there is a full com-
pliance with the written order of the drawer by a1 
endorsement, even though not genuine." The court 
went on to state the liability of the drawee bank as 
follows: 
"The drawer of the check, by his designation of the 
payees therein, in effect issued a definite order to the 
drawee bank and all others to whom the check might 
be presented for payment that it was to be paid only 
in accordance with his order to the payees therein 
named. When Herford, [the cashing bank] endorsed 
the check, 'Prior Endorsements Guaranteed,' the 
banks through which the check passed may have 
chosen to honor and pay the check, relying solely 
on Herford's guaranty, but this, in no wise, relieved 
the drawee bank of honoring the check only upon the 
endorsement of the payees therein named. The 
drawee bank simply, by cashing the check and charg· 
ing the same to the drawer's account, indicated a 
willingness to disregard and neglect its duty to the 
depositor upon the guaranty of a responsible bank 
that the duty of examining the check for endorse-
ment of the payees had been performed by it." (e.a.I 
Thus, from the authorities it is not the check 
which is in and of itseH the contract, but the de-
positor relationship with the bank by which the 
bank agrees to pay only the parties designated by 
the depositor. The fact that the depositor could stop 
payment on the check or an intervening garnish-
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ment might dissipate the funds, as happened in the 
recent case of State Bank of Southern Utah v. Stall-
ings. 427 P.2d 744, 19 Utah 2d 146, (1967), would not 
relieve the bank of its duty in a case where the banK 
undertook to pay the check and did so improperly. 
It is, therefore, clear that the Bank of Salt Lake 
as well as Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust Company 
is liable to the plaintiff for losses resulting from the 
violation of its duties to the intended beneficiaries 
of its depositor. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record in this case and upon 
the authorities herein cited, Respondent and Cross-
Appellant, Pacific Metals Company, Division of A. M. 
Castle and Company, respectfully prays that this 
court affirm the Summary Judgment entered in the 
court below against Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust 
Company and set aside and vacate the court's order 
below granting Judgment to Bank of Salt Lake 
against Pacific Metals Company Division of A. M. 
Castle and Company and denying said Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment against the Bank of Salt Lake. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
E. EARL GREENWOOD, JR. 
JAY A. MESERVY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant 
